Chapter
Eleven
Tunnel Hill
Awaiting further orders, the men of Cleburne’s Division got a
much-needed rest in the enemies’ old camps. It also gave them time to attend to
the wounded and account for the dead, most of whom had fallen during the second
days fighting. Out of 5,000 men, 1,743 were listed as killed or wounded.
Although high, this ratio was typical for other divisions; like Shiloh, the casualties were high: some 34,000 men fell in
the two days of fighting.
Late that afternoon, Cleburne
received the expected orders to move toward Chattanooga, where the Federals were fleeing.
Though tired, the division’s spirits were lifted by their recent victory and
they quickly covered half the distance before nightfall. Early the next
morning, September 22, the division arrived on top of Missionary
Ridge in full view of the town below. Unlike what Bragg had
expected, the Federals had decided to hold Chattanooga. Probing forward on the night of
the 24, two regiments from the division, the 35th and 48th
Tennessee, encountered
enemy skirmishers. After chasing them back into the town, the regiments halted
after seeing a strong line of Federals and returned to Missionary
Ridge.
The troops were not happy. They had hoped
to finish Rosecrans’s army off after the battle before they had time to
entrench themselves within the town. Although the generals had urged Bragg to
follow up on their victory the night of the 20, Bragg ignored them and went to
bed. Polk wrote Richmond,
“Bragg allowed the fruits of the great but sanguinary victory to pass from him
by the most criminal negligence”. Forrest was more direct. Marching into his
headquarters, Forrest yelled, “You have played the part of a d----d scoundrel, and are a coward, and
if you were any part of a man I would slap your jaws”. When Davis heard of this, he reassigned both Polk
and Forrest to new assignments. (1)
Bragg’s mishandling provoked an official
petition of removal from the generals. “Two weeks ago this army, elated by a
great victory which promised to prove the most fruitful of the war, was in
readiness to pursue its defeated enemy,” Buckner wrote. “Whatever may have been
accomplished heretofore, it is certain that the fruits of the victory of the Chickamauga have escaped
our grasp. The Army of Tennessee, stricken with a complete paralysis, will in a
few days’ time be thrown strictly on the defensive, and may deem itself
fortunate if it escapes from its present position without disaster”. After
Buckner signed it, three of his division commanders wrote their names on the
document. After this, it traveled to Hill’s headquarters where Hill signed it.
One of his generals, Breckinridge, refused to sign it but two of his three
brigadiers did. Cheatham, following his trend of loyalty to Bragg, refused to
sign. Liddell admitted that Bragg was a bad commander but that he could not
think of another general to fill the role. Lucius Polk, angry with Bragg for
his treatment of his uncle, the “Fighting Bishop”, replied truthfully, “anyone
would do better”. Cleburne
also signed the document before sending it to Longstreet’s Headquarters where
Longstreet and Bushrod Johnson signed it. Then it was sent to President Davis
in Richmond. (2)
Liddell, a general who Cleburne never got along with, felt it was
his duty to mention this action to Bragg. Bragg looked up from his work and
gruffly replied, “I want to get rid of all such generals. I have better men now
in subordinate stations to fill their places. Let them send in their
resignations. I shall accept every one without hesitation.” (3)
Apart from these occurrences, Cleburne’s Division
underwent reorganization. After S.A.M. Wood resigned from his command of the Alabama and Mississippi
brigade, Cleburne
recommended Mark P. Lowery. Lowery was the son of Irish Protestant immigrants.
After struggling with what he called an “almost unconquerable resolution to
become rich” in his youth, Lowery had answered the call to become a Baptist
preacher. After commanding a company at the war’s outbreak, Lowery had risen in
rank ever since; at Chickamauga, Cleburne personally
complemented him for his steadfastness. To command the Texas Brigade, Cleburne appointed J.A.
Smith, a West Pointer who had led the 5th Confederate Regiment well.
Liddell’s Brigade was also reappointed to the division. (4)
Bragg remained confident in total victory.
Now that the Federals were in Chattanooga
and his army was above the town on the surrounding heights, he could cut off
Rosecrans’s supply lines, compelling them to surrender. For now, though, it
seemed like it was the Confederates who were starving from lack of supplies. Sam
Watkins recalled, “The soldiers were starved and almost naked, and covered all
over with lice and camp itch and filth and dirt. The men looked sick,
hallow-eyed, and heart-broken, living principally upon parched corn, which had
been picked out of the mud and dirt under the feet of the officers’ horses. We
thought of nothing but starvation.” (5)
Sam Foster of the Texas Brigade recalled
the armies’ positions:
It is now about the
middle of October when our Army settles down around Chattanooga—we occupy
Lookout Mountain on our left, and have our large cannon on top of Lookout—Our
line there extends along Missionary Ridge about 12 miles to the river again
above Chattanooga—Our Brigade is on the side of the Ridge near Lookout—and we
are doing very heavy picket duty.
Although
the division did not drill during this time, the men were kept busy digging
trenches and constructing breastworks in preparation of the Yankee’s attack.
Fighting was kept to a minimum. Occasionally, a probing unit would fire at the
Confederate pickets, but orders were not to return fire as ammunition was low.
Every once in a while, an artillery duel would break out between the large
cannon on top of Lookout and a Federal fort opposite it across the river at
Moccasin Point. R.M. Collins, of the Texas Brigade, recalled “The boys with
mathematical turn of mind would figure on the distance from where we were to
the top of the mountain by the time it required the sound to reach us after we
could see the flash of the big guns”. (6)
Following the battle, Rosecrans
seemed to have lost his nerve. Starting with the general’s nervous crossing of
himself as the Army of the Cumberland routed on
the second day, his condition worsened into a mental unraveling as food
supplies ran low in Chattanooga.
Some of the Federals, in desperation, ate the horses’ feed from the stables. The
only open supply lines stretched across long desolate miles, which were easy
targets for Confederate guerrillas. One of these trails was shut down after Cleburne’s Whitworth squad
picked off the drivers of a wagon train, destroying 60 wagons. Wild mood swings
and a lack of planning for the coming campaign did not impress Washington at all. Lincoln commented that the
general seemed like “a duck hit on the head”. On October 9, the Army of the Cumberland was placed on quarter rations; seven days
later, Grant was appointed as commander of the Military Division of the Mississippi. Grant’s
first move was to replace “Old Rosy” as commander with George Thomas. His next
move called for reinforcements from Sherman’s
army and Hooker’s two corps. (7)
On the night of October 26, the siege was
lifted when Hazen’s Brigade, boarding pontoon boats, floated quietly down the Tennessee River. Landing near Brown’s Ferry, they
attacked the Confederate pickets, driving them in. Next, they hastily
constructed a pontoon bridge for Turchin’s Brigade to cross from the opposite
side. Hooker’s two corps later joined them, marching east from Bridgeport,
Alabama, across Raccoon
Mountain, and through Lookout Valley.
Bragg was furious, yet he did not counter
these moves with any of his own. Instead, he seemed to be more concerned with
personal vendettas against his generals. After the petition of removal reached Richmond, Davis
organized a meeting of corps commanders Longstreet, Buckner, and Hill with
Bragg and himself. In the meeting, Davis
asked the generals why they believed Bragg should be removed; not surprisingly,
each of the generals was consequently relieved or reassigned to a new department.
In this shuffle of command, Hardee was brought back and Cleburne was placed under his corps. Bragg
sent Longstreet and thus one-third of the army to Knoxville to confront Burnside under the
pretense of keeping the Federals from lifting the “siege”. Writing to Davis, Bragg wrote that
Longstreet’s departure had given him a “great relief”. (8)
On November 22, Bragg sent Cleburne
and Johnson’s Divisions to East Tennessee to
aid Longstreet. He believed that Sherman’s
army would reinforce Burnside soon. Instead, Grant, witnessing all these
movements up on the northern end of Missionary Ridge, quickly formed a plan of
action to send his main attack force there under Sherman. To buy time for Sherman’s
march to the northern end, Grant sent a probing force of Sheridan’s
and Wood’s Divisions to test Bragg’s center in front of Missionary
Ridge. While this fight, later known as Orchard Knob, was
occurring, a hastily written note reached Cleburne
while en route: “We are heavily
engaged. Move up rapidly to these headquarters.”(7)
November 23 was spent in transferring the
division back to Chattanooga.
Placing his brigades as Bragg directed, on the reverse slope of the ridge, Cleburne awaited further
orders for the expected attack by the Federals. Stevenson and his division,
placed precariously on top of Lookout Mountain, sent Bragg a dispatch, stating
that he believes the Federals are about to attack his position. Bragg, however,
believes that Orchard Knob is just the precursor to an assault against the
Confederate center on Missionary Ridge.
At headquarters the next morning, Cleburne found Bragg
“dejected and despondent”. Bragg, with a “wild abstracted look” informed him
that the enemy had crossed the Tennessee River both above and below the mouth of the Chickamauga. He directed Cleburne to send his best
units, a brigade and a battery, to guard the railroad bridge over Chickamauga
Creek, holding it at all hazards if a retreat was necessary. Cleburne
left headquarters, sending Polk’s Brigade and Semple’s Battery
accordingly. By midmorning, the crash of musketry could be heard through the
thick mist and cold drizzle on the Confederate left: Lookout Mountain.
By 1pm, the “Battle
above the Clouds” was over; the Federals had captured the summit. A short time
later, word reached Bragg that Federal divisions were seen near the northern
end of Missionary Ridge. Bragg ordered Cleburne and his division,
minus Polk and Semple, out of reserve to hold the most crucial point on the Confederate
right: Tunnel Hill.
Cleburne arrived at Tunnel
Hill by 2:30pm, November 24, and found a Major Poole from Hardee awaiting his
arrival. The major informed him that the Yankees were coming and hastily showed
him the ground he was expected to cover. Apart from guarding the tunnel itself,
the division had to stretch far southward enough in order to connect with the
next division, Walker’s. After a brief look at the ground, Cleburne
summarized that three brigades were not enough to hold such a distance and sent
Poole to ask for reinforcements. Meanwhile, Cleburne sent the Texas
Brigade, commanded by A.J. Smith to a spur about half a mile northwest of the
tunnel known as Billy Goat Hill. As he was deploying his men thinly across the
remaining ¾ of a mile from Tunnel Hill to the end of Walker’s line, a signal
corpsman came rushing up to the general, informing him that the Federals were
advancing on Billy Goat Hill.
Smith’s Texans raced across the valley
separating the main ridge from Billy Goat Hill only to find that the Federals
had beaten them to the top. After an ineffective fire, the Texans fell back
across the valley as the Federals gave a cheer. Cleburne
wrote, “It was evident the enemy was
endeavoring to turn my right flank and get possession of the main ridge between
my right and the Chickamauga.
If he succeeded, my connection with Brigadier-General Polk and my line of
retreat by the bridge he was guarding was cut, and the safety of the whole army
was endangered.” (8)
Cleburne acted quickly. Withdrawing
Liddell’s Brigade, commanded by Govan, from the line, he placed it with
supporting artillery on an isolated spur east of the main ridge, so as to cover
the railroad tunnel should the enemy try to pass through it. Ridding up to the
Texas Brigade, he wrapped them around the main ridge, like a horseshoe, in the
direction of Billy Goat Hill. No sooner had he done this than the Federals
appeared, advancing in force, up from the valley. Although outnumbered, the
Texans fought bravely and pushed the attackers back. Although today had been
scheduled for the big fight, Sherman,
realizing his error, recalled his men from their positions. When his
reconnaissance force had beaten the Texans to the top of Billy Goat Hill, they
had cheered so enthusiastically because they and Sherman believed that it was Missionary
Ridge. Finding that the main ridge was not continuous as
previously believed, Sherman
ordered his men into camp below the ridge.
Meanwhile, Sherman’s
error gave Cleburne
time to tweak his positions. It also gave him an idea of where to expect an
attack that next morning. Believing the enemy to be wrapped around the ridge in
the direction of Billy Goat Hill, he placed two of Lowery’s regiments on a spur
to the right of the Texans and north of the tunnel, leaving only the two
remaining regiments of Lowery’s Brigade connecting the division to Walker.
While these movements were being made,
Hardee rode up, approved of the changes and promised reinforcements then rode
on to his other division commanders. As the sun set, Cleburne ordered most of
his artillery and ordnance wagons across the South Chickamauga creek in
expectation of an order to fall back; with the “disaster at Lookout”, Cleburne thought there was little chance that
Bragg would try to hold Missionary Ridge—just in case he did, Cleburne ordered
his men to construct breastworks. About midnight, Buck returned from
headquarters with Bragg’s orders. After waiting some time for the corps
commanders to finish their lengthy debate, Hardee had emerged and gave Buck a
message, “Tell Cleburne we are to fight, that his division will undoubtedly be
heavily attacked, and that he mush do his very best”. Buck replied, “The
division had never yet failed to clear its front, and would do so again”. Now
sure of his orders, Cleburne
arranged for his artillery and ordnance wagons to rejoin him by
daylight. After making a “moonlight
survey of the ground and line of retreat”, he ordered the two regiments to join
Lowery on the spur and carefully placed his two pieces of artillery to enfilade
any line of the advancing enemy. Three regiments from Stevenson’s division
reinforced the Texans. As each brigade in the division shared axes in
constructing fortifications by the light of a full moon, suddenly it became pitch
black by an eclipse of the moon. Captain Foster recalled, “A picket is put out
in our front and we law down and go to sleep. No fires, no blankets, and not
permitted to talk above a whisper. Very Cold.” (9)
Through the morning
fog of November 25, Cleburne
could barely make out masses of bluecoats below him. Sherman’s army, numbering more than 30,000
men were preparing to attack his three brigades numbering less than 4,000. As
preliminary skirmishing commenced, Bragg rode into Tunnel Hill and nervously
inspected Cleburne’s
lines, then returned to his warm headquarters to await the results of the
fight. If there was any good news that morning, it was in the arrival of the
famous Orphan Brigade. Cleburne
placed his fourth brigade as reserve behind his main line. At about 11am, the
skirmishing ceased signaling the general attack. Cleburne wrote:
A heavy attack on the tunnel and on Smith's line was now imminent…The
enemy was now in sight, advancing in two long lines of battle, his right
stretching far beyond my left, his left, stretching beyond Smith's right, where
farther view of it was prevented by the woods that covered and bordered the
detached hill. For the full understanding of the fierce conflict that followed,
it would be proper for me in this place to give a statement of the force of the
enemy opposite my position as ascertained at a later hour from prisoners and
other sources. It consisted of the divisions of Maj. Gen. Jef. C. Davis, three
divisions of the army brought by Sherman from Vicksburg, and Howard's
(Eleventh) corps, of the Army of the Potomac, all under the command of
Major-General Sherman.
As soon as the
enemy was in sight, Cleburne
ordered his artillery to open fire. Crashing down the ridge, the 12-pound
cannon balls cut through Sherman’s
ranks, causing serious damage. Yet, with so many men, the blue ranks closed the
gaps and continued their steady advance. (10)
After pushing back
Smith’s skirmishers, the Federals met Cleburne’s
main line. Captain Foster recalled, “In a few minutes the Yank line of blue
coats come in sight…our small arms and theirs, all open, and they keep
coming—but when they get about 100 yards closer they fall back in bad order—in
other words they run”. One part of Sherman’s
line crested the top of the ridge and attacked Swett’s battery. The
artillerymen bravely stood by their guns under a deadly crossfire, firing
canister into their close ranks. As the enemy retreated, Smith asked permission
to charge them. Cleburne
gave his consent and the Texans charged down the ridge after the fleeing
bluecoats. After driving them all the way to the base of the hill, the Texans
returned to their position. In the charge, Smith had been wounded and the
brigade was turned over to the command of Colonel Hiram Granbury of the 7th
Texas. (11)
Although they had driven back
the first charge, Cleburne knew Sherman would attack
again. In less than 30 minutes following the first attack, the Federals made
another desperate charge. The oncoming Federals were met with a volley from the
Texas Brigade, fire from Govan’s battery, Douglas’,
and long-ranged flanking fire from the left of Lowery’s Brigade. Seeking
shelter from the hail of lead, the Federals took positions behind the nearest
rock and kept up a determined firefight. In order to dislodge them, Cleburne ordered Swett’s Battery
be added on Govan’s Hill. The extra firepower was more than the Federals could
stand and they retreated.
From his position at the base of
the ridge, Captain S.H.M. Byers of Sherman’s
army witnessed the fight.
All the morning the
hills and woods in front of Missionary Ridge
resounded with the crash of musketry. The battle raged for over an hour for the
possession of a single hill-crest. Once the hail of bullets became so heavy
that a temporary halt was made. The enemy had the advantage of position and
numbers everywhere. So close were they, and so protected behind rifle-pits,
logs, and boulders, that they could throw stones on the assaulting column and
do almost as much harm with them as with bullets. More regiments were sent in
to Corse, and the hand-to-hand assault was renewed till Corse himself was borne
wounded from the field. Still his men fought on, retreating not a foot.
About
1pm, Sherman
launched his largest assault. He committed four divisions to attack the north
flank from Billy Goat hill while simultaneously attacking the western flank at
Tunnel Hill. (12)
From his vantage point near
Key’s Battery, Cleburne
witnessed, “tier after tier of the enemy,
to the foot of the hill and in the valley beyond” converging up the ridge. Although the
batteries kept up a constant fire, the Federals continued to advance, closing
the open ground as quickly as they could. Captain
Byers recalled the ascent:
An awful cannonade
had opened on us. In front of us was a rail-fence. Its splinters and fragments
flew in every direction. "Jump the fence, boys," was the order, and
never was a fence sealed more quickly. It was nearly half a mile to the rebel
position, and we started on the charge, running across the open fields. I had
heard the roaring of heavy battle before, but never such a shrieking of
cannon-balls and bursting of shells as met us on that run. We could see the
rebels working their guns, while in plain view other batteries galloped up,
unlimbered, and let loose upon us. Behind us our own batteries were firing at
the enemy over our heads, till the storm and roar became horrible. The line
officers screamed at the top of their voices, trying to repeat the orders to
the men. " Steady, steady. Bear to the right ! Don't fire ! Steady,
steady," was yelled till every one of us was hoarse, and until the fearful
thunder of the cannonade made all commands unheard and useless. In ten minutes
the field was crossed, the foot of the ascent was reached, and now the Confederates
poured into our faces the reserved fire of their awful musketry. It helped
little that we returned it from our own rifles hidden as the enemy , were in
rifle-pits, behind logs, and stumps, and trees. Still we charged, and climbed a
fence in front of them, and charged again. The order was given to lie down and
continue firing. Then some one cried " Look to the tunnel !" There,
on the right, pouring through a tunnel in the mountain, and out of the railway
cut, came the gray-coats by hundreds, flanking us completely. " Stop them
!" cried our colonel to those of us at the right. " Push them back !
" It was but the work of a few moments to rise to our feet and run to the
mouth of the tunnel, firing as we ran. Too late ! They were through by
hundreds, and a fatal enfilading fire was cutting our line to pieces. No wonder
the brigade temporarily faltered and gave way, when a whole army of the enemy
seemed concentrated on a single point.
As the scattered divisions took cover under the
overhanging rocks, the Confederates rolled boulders down the ridge, smoking
them out of their positions and opening on them a deadly fire. Cleburne wrote, “the fight
had lasted unceasingly for an hour and a half, and the enemy seemed to be
constantly re-enforcing”. Cleburne’s
men were “becoming disheartened at the persistency of the enemy” and running
out of ammunition. Now, Cleburne
arranged for a simultaneous
assault of his own. At his command, the
now battle-hardened Texans who had borne the “brunt of this long day's fight”
along with the Arkansans and Georgians on the front line arose and charge down
the ridge onto the unsuspecting Federals. Cleburne
wrote, “the Texas
troops on the left pursuing him beyond the foot and nearly across the open
ground in front. Our charging columns returned with many prisoners and stand of
colors; a fresh force of the enemy, attempting to follow us as we returned from
this charge, was quickly met and routed by the Fiftieth Tennessee and with
troops of my division.” (13)
Shortly after this, Sherman’s
artillery opened fire on the pursuing division to cover their men as they
hurriedly built barricades. As Cleburne
surveyed the battleground, he concluded, “the enemy must have suffered
severely, the hillside and the valley were thickly strewn with his dead”. His
own casualties amounted to 42 killed, 178 wounded, and 2 missing. Of the
unknown privates listed among the killed, he wrote, “I can but lament. I did
not personally know them, but I saw and can bear witness to their gallant
bearing and noble deaths”. (14)
As
night fell, Cleburne
sent a party to feel the Federals. They were gone. Despite this incredible
seven-hour stand against odds of greater than 4 to 1, Cleburne’s
Division was soon joining the rest of the Army of the Tennessee in a retreat. Although they, the
Confederate right, had held strong, the center had broke. Cleburne wrote,
Soon after night was upon us, and General Hardee ordered an immediate
retreat across the Chickamauga, and that Smith's
(Texas)
brigade should remain in position and bring up the rear. General Lowery
attacked and drove back the enemy's skirmishers in his front and then
retreated. By 9 p.m. everything was across except the dead and a few stragglers
lingering here and there under the shadow of the trees for the purpose of being
captured, faint-hearted patriots succumbing to the hardships of the war and the
imagined hopelessness of the hour. I now ordered Smith's brigade to move in
retreat. Sadly, but not fearfully, this band of heroes left the hill they had
held so well and followed the army across the Chickamauga. (15)
Sources
1: Lone Star General: pages 60-61
: Ibid: page 61
2: This Band of Heroes: Granbury’s Texas
Brigade, C.S.A. by James M. McCaffrey
3: Stonewall of the West: chapter 8 page 154
: Ibid: page 155
4:
Stonewall of the West: chapter 9 page 159
5: Co.
Aytch: chapter 10 page 99
6: One of Cleburne’s Command:
chapter 2 page 57
: Ibid:
page 58 notes
7: The
Chattanooga Campaign: an article found on www.civilwarhome.com/chattanoogasummary.htm
8: Stonewall of the West: chapter 9 page 161
7: Cleburne’s report of the Chattanooga-Ringgold
Campaign: O.R. Series I Vol. XXXI part 2
8: O.R. Series I Vol. XXXI part 2
9: O.R. Series I Vol. XXXI part 2
: Stonewall of the West: chapter 9 page 166
: One of Cleburne’s Command:
chapter 2 pages 60-1 notes
: O.R. Series I Vol. XXXI part 2
: One of Cleburne’s Command:
chapter 2 page 59
10: O.R. Series I Vol. XXXI part 2
11: One of Cleburne’s
Command: chapter 2 page 63
12: Sherman’s
Attack on the Tunnel: an article by Captain S.H.M.
Byers
13: O.R.
Series I Vol. XXXI part 2
: Sherman’s Attack on the Tunnel
: O.R. Series I Vol. XXXI part 2
: Ibid
: Ibid
: Ibid
14: O.R. Series I Vol. XXXI
part 2
: Ibid
15: O.R. Series I Vol. XXXI
part 2